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ARTICLES
Negotiating for Dispute Settlement in
Transnational Mineral Contracts: Current
Practice, Trends, and an Evaluation from the
Host Country's Perspective
THOMAS WXLDE*
I. INTRODUCTION: TRANSNATIONAL MINERAL CONTRACTS
Transnational investment contracts between transna-
tional enterprises' (TNEs) and host countries, particularly de-
veloping countries, have been shrouded in a veil of secrecy for
a long time. Such secrecy may have been due mainly to the
often one-sided distribution of benefits, favoring the TNE at
the cost of the host country. Host countries often had compara-
tively weak bargaining power and little experience in negotiat-
ing the complex and comprehensive contractual and legislative
regime for large-scale investment projects. This secrecy is grad-
ually disappearing particularly in the area of natural resources
development, which is the focus of the present paper.2
* The author worked in 1976 and 1977 with the United Nations Centre on Trans-
national Corporations as an Associate Transnational Corporations Officer. At present
he is a research fellow with the research team on the International Law of Natural
Resources at the Institute of Foreign and International Economic Law (Auslindisches
und Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht), University of Frankfurt. Part of the research on
the present article was financed by the Deutsche Forschunsgemeinschaft. The views
expounded in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily representative
of the views of the institutions with which he has been affiliated.
Much of the author's analysis is based upon an examination of approximately 200
large-scale mineral contracts, some public, some confidential, dealing with petroleum
and nonfuel mineral development. Because of the confidentiality of many of the docu-
ments, no reference can be made to their source. The author has also relied upon a
series of interviews with negotiators from mining companies, international institu-
tions, and host countries. For their assistance and criticism, the author is especially
grateful to Charles Lipton, Esq., and Eric Bergsten, Esq., as well as to his colleagues
at the United Nations and the Institute.
1. For the use of the term "transnational" instead of either "multinational" or
"international," see P. JEsp, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). In the official terminology
of the United Nations corporations formerly called "multinational" are presently
termed "transnational." See E.S.C. Res. 1913, 57 U.N. ESCOR, Special Intersessional
Committee (1931st mtg.), U.N. Doc. E/5599 (1974). A transnational investment con-
tract means, for the purposes of this study, a contract between a transnational corpora-
tion (enterprise) and a host country or a host country entity relating to investment.
2. See Walde, Lifting the Veil from Transnational Mineral Contracts: A Review
of Recent Literature, 1 NAT. RFs. FORUM 277 (1977).
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Traditionally, information on such agreements has come
to light only from the few surfacing and published international
arbitration cases.' At present, information concerning their
actual texts derives mainly from publication in official gazettes
and from the Security and Exchange Commission's publicly
available files, while information concerning the main ele-
ments of such agreements appears also in trade journals and
commercial information services.' Additionally, the political
sensitivity of natural resources exploitation in developing coun-
tries and the evolution of the right of host states to permanent
sovereignty over natural resources' have stimulated research in
this area from the legal, economic, and political science
perspectives.'
The transnational mineral agreements to be discussed here
involve economic and political interests of great weight, i.e.,
the interests of consuming nations in maintaining a steady flow
of raw materials necessary for the functioning of their in-
dustrial systems and the interests of developing countries in
using their natural resources to obtain the substantial funds
3. Reports of these arbitration cases are repeatedly encountered. In the prewar
period, the major cases were Lena Goldfields, I ANNUAL DIGEST OF INT'L LAW CASES,
nos. 1 & 258 (1930), and Socidt6 Rialet, VIII RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DES TAM 742
(1929). For postwar cases, see Saudi Arabia v. Aramco, 27 INT'L L. REP. 272 (1958);
Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., 20 INT'L L. REP. 534 (1953); Petroleum
Development, Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 INT'L L. REP. 144 (1951); the Sapphire
arbitration, extracted in ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 273 (1952); Sentence
arbitrale du 19 janvier 1977, L'Arbitre Unique, Rend-Jean Dupuy (Fr.), reprinted in
104 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 350 (1977) (Un Grand Arbitrage Ptrolier, Tex-
aco/Calasiatic c/ Gouvernement Libyen); Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-
Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Weil, Problkmes relatifs aux
contrats passes entre un 6tat et un particulier, 1969-111 RECUEIL DES COURS 95, 164
(1969); J. Kuusi, State Contracts with Foreigners: Considerations on Law and Policy
(1976) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University).
4. See Development of an Information System 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/28 (1977).
5. For recent action, see G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3171 (1973). For relevant resolutions concerning the New Economic Order
see also G.A. Res. 3202, 6 U.N. GAOR, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Sixth
Special Session (Agenda Item 7), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3202 (1974); G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR, Report of the Second Committee (Agenda Item 48), U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3281 (1975). For an analysis of the development until 1966, see M. MUGHEABY, PERMA-
NENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER OIL RESOURcES (1966); for a discussion of the recent evolution
of the permanent sovereignty concept within the framework of the New International
Economic Order, see RiA KEMPER, NATIONAL VERFOGUNG OBER NATORLICH RESSOURCEN
UND DIE NEUE WELTWIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG DER VERRINTEN NATIONEN (1976).
6. Wkilde, supra note 2. Mention should also be made of the recently published
study of the COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, A STUDY ON THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK,




necessary to achieve speedy industrialization. In addition, de-
veloping countries would like to employ their resource base as
a starting point for resource-centered industrialization by pro-
cessing, refining, and finally fabricating their natural resources
and by creating forward and backward linkages. The nonre-
newability of most exploited resources raises the fear of exploi-
tation by TNEs to very high levels of concern.
Transnational mineral contracts (TMCs) constitute the
legal regime for investment projects cf enormous investment
volumes. Due to exploitation of low-grade ore bodies, the ne-
cessity of exploiting economies of scale to the greatest degree,
and rising costs of infrastructure in remote, unexplored, and
undeveloped areas of the world, the investments required for
many recent individual projects in copper, iron ore, and baux-
ite often reach the magnitude of $1 billion. The Carajas iron
ore project in Brazil, for example, apparently requires an in-
vestment of $3 billion. Thus, it is not surprising that large-scale
mining projects are following the tradition of petroleum exploi-
tation. These operations are undertaken by large consortia en-
compassing various mining companies, metals trading houses
with long term purchase commitments, and lending groups,
often consisting of up to forty private banks and development
financing institutions.7
Accordingly, the negotiation and the final drafting of the
legal regime for such large-scale investment projects poses a
great challenge. Evolved from simple concession contracts with
straightforward royalty provisions and few "frills," the modem
transnational mineral contract often constitutes a hybrid com-
bination of contractual alternatives. These include traditional
concessions forms, joint ventures, service, management, and
technical assistance agreements (with long-ranging commit-
ments), reinvestment, expansion into processing, and long
term purchase obligations. A complex array of legal forms is
designed to cover the multifaceted interests of the host country
related to the mining venture. The complete dependence of
some producer countries on the mining project along with the
inevitable clash between the TNEs worldwide, oligopolistic,
and integrated planning system and the host country's escalat-
ing demands do not facilitate the negotiation.
7. See Zorn, New Developments in Third World Mining Agreements, 1 NAT. REs.
FORUM 239 (1977).
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Research on the various issues of negotiation for TMCs
requires an interdisciplinary approach, combining legal, busi-
ness, economic, and political skills. The objectives of such re-
search depend on the audience to which it is directed. For
instance, if the TNE is the addressee, research is intended to
assist the TNE to find a contractual regime which accounts
for probable political upheavals. Additionally, a thorough
understanding of the political risk involved8 as well as the
needs, interests, and perceptions of the host country may help
to design contractual forms less visible, less antagonistic, and
more viable for the specific situation of the host country.' Re-
search for home governments may point to the alternatives best
securing a steady flow of raw materials, e.g., through either
indirect support of operations of TNEs or by direct or mediated
relationships with the producer countries. Finally, the mere
collection of information and research on transnational mineral
contracts will probably be of assistance to developing host
countries.' 0 This collection and analysis of contract-related in-
formation will assist host states in gaining the necessary experi-
ence in order to secure a more equal footing with TNEs, to
formulate more precisely their own policies in the development
of their mining industry," and to implement such policies by
effective negotiation with foreign investors. In this area the
potential contribution of the UN Centre on Transnational Cor-
porations is of considerable importance-be it in collecting and
disseminating relevant information to developing countries or
in stimulating cooperation among developing countries for a
mutual exchange of relevant experiences with TNEs.'2
Traditional legal research has focused mainly on the legal
issues which arise once a conflict has been brought to an inter-
8. Kobrin, The Conditions under which Political Disruption Results in Increased
Political Risk (1977) (working paper, Mass. Inst. Tech.); D. HAENDEL, G. WEST & R.
MEADOW, OVERSEAS INVESTMENT AND PouTicAL RISK (1975).
9. See Wells, Negotiating with Third World Governments, 55 HARv. Bus. REV. 72
(1977).
10. Smith, Information-Sharing and Bargaining: Institutional Problems and
Limitations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES FLows (G. Garvey
ed. 1977).
11. R. BossoN & B. VARON, THE MINING INDUSTRY AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
252 (1977).
12. For the establishment of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corpo-
rations and its duties, see 57 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1A) 3, U.N. Doc. E/5570/Add.
1 (1974). See also United Nations, Programme of Technical Cooperation on Matters
Related to Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/29 (1977), for a description
of the technical services related to negotiations with TNCs.
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national arbitration tribunal for attention.' 3 It has rarely been
concerned about issues of how to negotiate and draft invest-
ment agreements in a way which takes full account of the
objectives of developing countries and which contributes to-
wards a maintenance of the investment relationship that is
advantageous to the developing countries and acceptable to the
TNE. The traditional perspective dominating most of the liter-
ature on dispute settlement in concessions agreements is due
partly to the fact that most commentators come from Western
legal systems and accordingly will be more likely to defend
legal positions favorable to TNEs and the capital-exporting
states. Perhaps a reorientation of legal research from postdeci-
sion analysis of a dispute to conflict avoidance is necessary.
Such a reorientation could be representative of the interests of
home countries, of TNEs, or of host countries. This new ap-
proach will be able to contribute towards a greater stabilization
of mutually advantageous investment relationships, to mini-
mize the costs of the often escalating conflicts between investor
and host state, and to assist the achievement of the objectives
of the New International Economic Order.
The main issues in negotiating TMCs are the fiscal regime
of the contract, the determination of the distribution of direct
benefits from the projects, and, increasingly, the economic de-
velopment provisions. Through the latter technique, the host
state attempts to increase its indirect benefits, such as local
processing, national employment, localization of supply pur-
chases and participation in marketing. The present paper,
however, focuses on dispute settlement.
Dispute settlement is the classical area upon which law-
yers have focused their interests when negotiating and analyz-
ing such agreements. The abundant literature available on
legal issues of international arbitration has had a strong impact
on the actual drafting. The negotiation for dispute settlement
provisions in agreements is also heavily affected by the strong
controversies raging at present on issues of international arbi-
tration and of the internationalization of investment agree-
ments. One of the major thrusts in the evolution of the concept
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources'4 has been the
13. See Weil, supra note 3, at 121-25; Lalive, Contracts Between a State or a State
Agency and a Foreign Company, 13 1r'L & Con. L.Q. 987, 988-90 (1964).
14. See Mughraby, supra note 5.
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attempt of developing countries to throw off the burden of in-
ternational arbitration as an imposition on their national sov-
ereignty. In the current international negotiations being held
on the implementation of the New International Economic
Order, on the Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations
and on the future shape of an international law of the sea, 5 the
scope and form of dispute settlement is very controversial. A
focus point is the clash between Western states' policies of
protection of foreign investment and the emphasis which the
Third World strongly places on economic sovereignty.
The present paper is directed towards filling the gap of
information concerning existent transnational mineral contrac-
tual practice. As mentioned, information of a larger scale on
TMCs has been forthcoming only very recently and mostly in
the area of petroleum concessions." These traditional conces-
sions have substantially evolved, first in petroleum, from the
joint venture (1957) to the service contract type (1966), with
nonfuel mining gradually following this development. Emerg-
ing concepts of permanent sovereignty, the energy crisis, and
a wave of nationalizations in the 1970s have exercised a strong
impact on subsequent negotiations and renegotiation of agree-
ments. These changes, strongly reflected in dispute settlement
clauses, have not yet been reflected in the available studies.
An updated survey of recent developments is warranted
for various reasons. First, it helps to inform those parties
(TNEs and host countries) directly affected by natural re-
sources development about the present context of contractual
negotiations. Additionally, it may contribute toward an evolu-
tion taking place in the theory of transnational contract law.
Legal writers, particularly those from capital-exporting
countries, have attempted to "internationalize" investment
agreements. This has occurred with a view towards achieving
greater investment security by exempting such contracts from
15. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975);
G.A. Res. 3202, 6 U.N. GAOR (Special Sess.), Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); G.A. Res. 3201, 6 U.N. GAOR (Special Sess.), Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974). See also THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (K. Sauvant & H.
Hasenflug eds. 1977).
16. Relevant literature is reviewed in Wilde, supra note 2. For a particularly
informative discussion of arbitration provisions in petroleum concessions, see Sarre,
Arbitration Clauses in the Oil Industry in the Middle East, in INTERNATIONAL COMMER-




national law and placing them under the protection of a body
of international law, which in its traditional form still favors
the interests of TNEs. Such internationalization has been
hindered by the absence of substantive legal rules to be applied
to investment agreements once they are thought to be subject
to an "international" or "transnational" law of contracts.
Commentators have also looked upon existing contractual
practice as a means to furnish some substantive rules. 7 In
doing so there is substantial risk that contractual practice of
the past, generally more favorable to TNEs, may be relied upon
to justify the arguments about a substantive law applicable to
agreements. On the other hand, this practice has in the mean-
time evolved to the considerable advantage of developing coun-
tries. Yet, the frequent application of a nonnational law and a
nonnational jurisdiction in older agreements has been mistak-
enly used to construct general principles for submitting invest-
ment agreements to principles, rules, and jurisdictions outside
the host state.
The present paper intends to give a descriptive survey of
current contractual practices as well as some indication of the
method that the host countries should use in evaluating the
various alternatives of dispute settlement solutions. It does not
purport to be a strict guide to negotiations. Indeed, a host
country may often be advised to give concessions in the area
of dispute settlement if it obtains corresponding benefits in
other areas of negotiation. However, for a sophisticated nego-
tiation, a clarification of the maximum objectives in bargaining
and a clear idea about possible fallback positions and their
evaluation is necessary. Hence, the present paper will attempt
to outline some maximum positions achievable in addition to
fallback positions for compromise solutions. The position to be
agreed upon in the final analysis obviously hinges upon the
relative bargaining power and the particular preferences of the
TNE and host country. Finally, the present practice may give
some clues about future trends. Such trends may lead to solu-
tions which accommodate the security interest of the investor
and the sovereignty objective of the host country. The present
paper is based on a survey of a large number of recent contracts
(dating from 1968 to 1977), in the area of petroleum as well as
nonfuel mineral development.s A systematic tabular survey
17. See Weil, supra note 3, at 196-99.
18. See generally D. SMITH & L. WELLS, NEGOTATING THIRD WoaLD MINE.L
AGREEMENTS 123 (1976).
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has not been prepared, as such a survey may give a false im-
pression of the extent to which contracts treated here are repre-
sentative of others.
II. DISPUTES IN TRANSNATIONAL MINERAL CONTRACTS AND
FUNCTIONS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
In transnational mineral contracts relating to large-scale
and long term investment projects, the quantity and the in-
tensity of disputes will generally be considerably greater than
in traditional sales or equity investment transactions. 9 They
relate to issues of broad multifaceted business relationships
and involve questions of management, marketing, accounting,
reinvestment, and the economic feasibility of a multimillion
dollar investment. In particular the worldwide planning system
of the TNE, and certain interests of home countries it repre-
sents, e.g., to maintain employment in mineral processing and
fabricating industries, will certainly confront the development
goals of the host country. The characteristic controversies be-
tween North and South, as reflected in the discussion for a New
International Economic Order, are reflected as well on a micro-
level in the disputes between the TNE and the host country.
Worldwide profit maximization and home country interests
therefore clash with the objective of the host country to use the
mining venture as a vehicle for development. Some common
reasons for disputes characteristic of natural resources foreign
investment are the following:
(1) the long duration of the projects (historically up
to ninety-nine years, now generally between fifteen
and thirty-five years) and the great uncertainty of
future events bearing upon the projects' economic
feasibility (e.g., commodity prices on world markets,
inflation, possible substitutes for the minerals ex-
tracted, exchange rates, and political instability);
(2) the long time between the initial heavy invest-
ment and the first returns to the investor (often seven
to ten years);
(3) the large number of actors involved, i.e., mining
companies, consumers with long term commitments,
19. C. KIRCHNER, E. SCHANZE, F. VON SCHLABRENDORFF, A. STOCKMAYER, T. W.LDE,
M. FRITZSCHE & R. PATZINA, ROHSTOFFERSCHLIESSUNGSVORHABEN IN ENTWICKLUNGS-
LANDERN 301 (1977) [hereinafter cited as KIRCHNER]. A second volume, scheduled for




financing institutions, local interests among host
country ministries, often compel the contracting par-
ties to elect between contradictory demands-even
on the side of the investor and the financing institu-
tions, conflicts among consortium members are
rather frequent; and
(4) the high political visibility of natural resource
exploitation, i.e., the transportation of nonrenewable
resources, the financial scale of the project, the de-
pendence on outside financing, and the typical de-
pendence of the host country on foreign exchange
earnings from project revenues.
Disputes in such long term investment relationships may
be divided into several categories:
Disputes of a predominantly technical
character.0 Disputes concerning technical decisions
and expertise are more common and warranted than
legal interpretation problems of the contract. Qualifi-
cation of a dispute as "technical" does not imply
minor importance. The decision on the economic fea-
sibility of the exploitation or a processing project may
be of primary importance to both parties. But it does
not imply that such disputes can automatically be
decided in a mechanistic, "neutral" application of
technical rules. The issue of inherent biases in techni-
cal rule application is discussed below.
Disputes concerning the interpretation of the
agreement and applicable law. Such disputes may be
called "minor" disputes, as they do not question the
validity of the agreement as such, but only refer to
various constructions of it. This type of dispute is the
traditional working ground for legal skills.
Disputes arising from gaps in the agreement.2
Such disputes involve matters which have not been
20. For an analysis of technical dispute settlement provisions in petroleum con-
cessions, see P. FISCHER, DIE INTERNATIONALE KONZESSION 415 (1974).
21. See the PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONGRESS
(1975), and in particular the contributions of Holtzmann, Powers of Arbitrators under
United States Law to Fill "Gaps" arising under Long-Term Contracts, id. at C IVh 1-
17, and Bernini, Techniques for Resolving Problems in Forming and Performing Long-
Term Contracts, id. at C Iva 1-37. See also H. Holtzmann & G. Bernini, Arbitration
in Long-Term Transactions, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1974).
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covered in the agreement and which cannot be re-
solved by legal reasoning on the basis of an existing
authoritative text yet do not involve a demand for
complete revision of the contract.
Disputes arising from one party's desire for a re-
vision of the basic terms of the agreement (particu-
larly the fiscal regime).2 This party is often, but not
always, the host country. Such demands are caused
by changed circumstances, excessive profits, a
change in government, or other similar reasons. Such
disputes are different in their character and in their
amenability to dispute settlement from the "minor"
disputes mentioned above. Attempts to transfer set-
tlement mechanisms workable for minor disputes to
such major disputes have been a constant cause for
dissatisfaction, threatening the utility of arbitration
in the area of minor disputes.
The general functions of specific dispute settlement provi-
sions, as opposed to those which impliedly or expressly require
submission to a national jurisdiction, are, first, to provide a
forum for dispute settlement, which, by its atmosphere and
supposedly greater familiarity with the commercial issues in-
volved, is more conducive to amicable settlement. The likeli-
hood of such an amicable settlement promotes the greater
readiness of the parties to accept an arbitral award and con-
tributes to the maintenance of the long term relationship even
after potentially disruptive disputes have taken place.23 A
second function is to provide a forum for dispute settlement
which is not favorably disposed towards one party. The suspi-
cion of partiality of national courts is a major cause for TNEs'
insistence on international arbitration tribunals.2 4 On the
other hand, developing countries often have an equally strong
suspicion that international arbitration tribunals have a sys-
temic bias in favor of the causes advanced by investors. This
apprehension can be caused by the selection of umpires, by the
22. A survey prepared by the author of major mining agreements reveals that such
major agreements, in particular recent ones dealing with petroleum and bauxite, rarely
remain unaltered over a period of more than ten years. See generally Committee on
Natural Resources, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 4 U.N. ESCOR,
U.N. Doc. E/C.7/53 (1975); 29 U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. A/97/6 (1974).
23. See C. Schmitthoff, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 16, at 1-45.
24. See Sarre, supra note 16; Wesley, The Procedural Malaise of Foreign Invest-
ment Disputes in Latin America: From Local Tribunals to Factfinding, 7 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 813 (1975).
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inherent effects of procedural rules, or by bias of the decision
criteria employed in favor of investment by TNEs, and their
suspicion is exacerbated by multiple decisions in favor of the
investors in the few reported decisions of international arbitra-
tion tribunals. 5 Third, the dispute settlement provisions are
meant to provide, particularly in the form of international arbi-
tration, an instrument for the TNE to stabilize the terms of
investment initially negotiated. It is recognized that in the
initial period before the bulk of the investment is committed,
and before any decisions on expansion and reinvestment are
taken,"6 the TNE often has considerable superiority in terms of
bargaining power, along with its frequent superiority in terms
of information, know-how, and experience. Terms negotiated
initially will necessarily reflect the TNE's superior bargaining
power. Once the investment has been committed and once the
operations prove successful, however, the pendulum swings in
favor of the host country. Then attempts by the host country
to obtain a revision of the unequal terms of the original agree-
ment are rather frequent and often unavoidable." Failure of
the TNE to respond may then lead to costly escalation for
both parties. The most visible forms of such costs are national-
ization on one hand and isolation from international marketing
channels on the other. The TNE accordingly will try to build
into the contractual regime a number of defenses against later
revision along with other defensive measures such as con-
structing a common front of financing institutions, long term
purchasers, and mining competitors." The TNE may also at-
tempt to induce home countries to grant additional protection
in the form of diplomatic support, foreign and military aid
investment, investment insurance, or bilateral investment
protection treaties."
One major instrument that bblsters the TNE's defense
25. The Baruch-Foster decision appears to be one of the few exceptions. For
reports and analyses of these cases, see sources cited in note 3 supra.
26. This issue has been explored in considerable depth in T. MORAN, MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE PoIrTIcs OF DEPENDENCE 153 (1975). See also KIRCHNER,
supra note 19.
27. Sources cited note 22 supra.
28. See Moran, Transnational Strategies of Protection and Defense by Multina-
tional Corporations: Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost for Nationalization in
Natural Resources, 27 INT'L ORGANIZATION 273 (1973); N. GIRVAN, CORPORATE IMPERIAL-
ISM: CONFLICT AND EXPROPRIATION 52 (1962). As I understand it, OPIC is planning to
develop an insurance scheme geared to protect investors against forced alteration of
investment contracts.
29. See A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962);
GIRVAN, supra note 28.
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lines against renegotiation is international arbitration.0 Judg-
ing from the TNEs' present posture supporting such interna-
tional arbitration, it appears that in TMCs it is not so much
the function of amicable settlement but rather the function of
investment protection which is at the heart of dispute settle-
ment negotiation. The prospect of a negative award from an
international arbitration body and the prospects of the various
sanctions implied, e.g., loss of credit rating, of foreign invest-
ment, of foreign aid, and isolation from established marketing
channels, will often deter host countries from invoking their
sovereign power to change contracts by legislative action.,
The negotiation of dispute settlement provisions necessar-
ily occurs in the context of the asymmetric relationship be-
tween a sovereign, developing state and the TNE, a direct or
vicarious holder of economic power often far superior to that of
the host country. This asymmetric relationship obviously lim-
its the application of orthodox legal theory related to dispute
settlement and international arbitration. Thus, many experi-
ences and considerations valid in international commercial
arbitration are therefore not applicable.
It is often remarked that the amount of legal literature
devoted to the legal theories surrounding arbitration dispro-
portionately surpasses the small number of actual arbitration
cases. My survey of the major contracts in petroleum and non-
fuel minerals reveals that in less than one percent of the con-
tracts have the dispute settlement provisions actually been
invoked. However, arbitration provisions have an importance
which may be considerably greater than the few cases suggest.
Submission to nonnational arbitration affects the ongoing
bargaining processes which take place among the parties
throughout the whole life of the project.2 This bargaining
process may entail constant revision, modification, and imple-
mentation of the original contractual document. In this bar-
gaining game the original document and its terms are not with-
out effect. The agreements lays down certain positions, which
may be the basis for implicit bargaining, as it provides the
parties with leverage against demands from the other side.
Such leverage is conferred upon the investor by virtue of a
potential appeal to an international arbitration tribunal. As
30. The investor's perspective is very clearly presented in Schmidt, Arbitration
under the Auspices of the ICSID: Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in
ALCOA v. Government of Jamaica, 17 HAMv. Ir'L L.J. 90 (1976).
31. See GIRVAN, supra note 28.
32. KIRCHNER, supra note 19, at 301.
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the Jamaica bauxite cases have shown, such an appeal may
not always eliminate a unilateral change of the project's terms
by government legislation. However, any party deciding on a
unilateral course of action will carefully consider the costs im-
posed by a negative award.
Apart from their deterrent effect, the dispute settlement
provisions will always have an impact on the continuing nego-
tiations for a revision of the terms of the contract. Most con-
tracts do not expire without having been subject to numerous
changes. 33 In bargaining for such revisions the TNE has some
leverage if it can point to the adverse effects of a potential
arbitral award in its favor. Accordingly, it can "sell" its arbi-
tration rights for concessions from the host country. Major re-
cent renegotiations of agreements contain such a retreat by the
TNE from institutional arbitration proceedings in exchange for
concessions from the host country. The bargaining chip effect
of dispute settlement provisions is shaped by the individual
traits of the dispute settlement mechanism at issue. Thus, a
party will carefully consider the procedural framework, time
limits, and the applicable substantive law upon which the se-
lected tribunal (the arbitrators and the prospective umpire)
will rely.
III. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
The main conflict in negotiations for dispute settlement in
TMCs evolves around the issue of international or nonnational
arbitration. Arbitration between corporations of various na-
tionalities in international business is quite common. Such an
arbitration has widely replaced the jurisdiction of national
courts and has become recognized by the various national laws
recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards. 4
In the asymmetric relationship of a developing host coun-
try and a TNE, however, many of the factors contributing to-
wards the growth of international commercial arbitration are
missing, particularly the homogeneity of principles of decision-
making, of business outlook, and of comparable structures of
organization and attitudes. The issues at stake are different
from commercial arbitration. The obligations of a commercial
nature are subordinate to public law, the legislative, taxing,
and foreign trade authority of the host state. Hence, it is not
surprising that governments are very reluctant to submit issues
33. See sources cited note 22 supra.
34. For an examination of the pertinent issues, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 16, passim.
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involving their national sovereignty to nonnational jurisdic-
tion.
Additionally, Western governments generally do not agree
to submit matters involving their legislative powers to a nonna-
tional tribunal. For example, Australian mineral contracts,
constituting a very substantial part of the present mineral pro-
jects of the world, do not provide for such arbitration. France,
as well, has been very reluctant to submit even matters of a
merely commercial nature to international arbitration when
government-owned enterprises are concerned.3 5 Investment
agreements of TNCs in Western countries, concluded particu-
larly with the government on the state or municipal level, also
do not contain international arbitration. No contract between
a TNE and the authorities of a Western host country contains
submission to the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investments Disputes (ICSID), unlike a large number of agree-
ments in African and some Asian developing countries."6
It is therefore more understandable than some Western
commentators suggest37 that developing countries perceive in-
ternational arbitration as an imposition on their national sov-
ereignty by authorizing a nonnational body to judge their sov-
ereign acts. Latin American countries, in their opposition to
nonnational arbitration, rely on the tradition of the Calvo doc-
trine, whereas several oil producers of great bargaining power
(notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Algeria) rely on strong
OPEC recommendations against international arbitration. 8
The United Nations resolutions dealing with permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources of the 1970s clearly espouse the
view that international arbitration, particularly in natural re-
35. See Battifol, Arbitration Clauses Concluded Between French Government-
Owned Enterprises and Foreign Private Parties, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 32 (1968).
36. Frequently, African countries which were once French colonies submit to
ICSID arbitration, e.g., Agreement between Ivory Coast and Uniwax (1968); Agree-
ment between Senegal and Societe Textile (1968); Agreement between Mauritania and
AGIP (1971). See generally Delaume, Excuse for Non-Performance and Force Majeure
in Economic Development Agreements, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 242, 261 n.54
(1971).
37. Representative of the view of most Western commentators on the general
utility of international aribitration is Wesley, supra note 24. Western governments
have adopted the same position in the current negotiations for a Code of Conduct of
Transnational Corporations. See Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/
Ac. 2/1 (1977); Transnational Corporations: Material Relevant to the Formulation of
a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/18 (1977).
38. See OPEC Res. XVI. 90 (1968), reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1183
(1968); Vafai, Conflict Resolution in the International Petroleum Industry, 5 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 427 (1971).
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sources, is contrary to the sovereignty of host countries.39 Yet
it remains unclear whether such resolutions serve mainly as a
recommendation that host countries abstain from the critical
submission to foreign arbitration in natural resources exploita-
tion matters or whether these resolutions imply that submis-
sions are void insofar as sovereignty rights are inalienable.
As far as the actual submission to nonnational arbitration
is concerned, one can safely state that the Latin American
countries have to a large extent adhered to the Calvo doctrine
and refused submission to an international arbitration tribunal
(e.g., ICSID or ICC). Occasionally, however, when under pres-
sure to enter an investment contract, complex solutions have
evolved. Also, ways have been found to restrict the scope of the
Calvo doctrine.
With respect to OPEC countries with strong bargaining
power, such as Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Vene-
zuela, submission to any foreign jurisdiction and any foreign
law has become increasingly rare in recent years. Certainly, the
strong stance of OPEC on this issue has had some repercussions
in actual negotiations. It seems that by now submission to
nonnational jurisdiction and foreign law is antiquated in petro-
leum contracts. In mineral agreements, the trend is slower but
points in the same direction. National law is increasingly the
only law stipulated as applicable; nonnational arbitration is
less frequent. Compromise solutions are national arbitration
procedures, according to the contractual provisions or, as ob-
served in countries with an English legal system, according to
the national arbitration act.40 National courts acquire a grow-
ing role in matters related to the contract.
Ultimately, the form of arbitration depends on the bar-
gaining power of the parties and the give-and-take peculiar to
the contract. A policy of steadfast refusal to submit to interna-
tional arbitration may, therefore, be broken occasionally. If one
is willing to perceive the dispute settlement as an indicator of
the relative bargaining power, one will find that TNEs have
more bargaining power in licensing and manufacturing con-
tracts than in natural resources agreements. Most manufactur-
39. See sources cited note 5 supra. The position of the developing countries in
the negotiations for a Code of Conduct, see note 37, supra, is also opposed to interna-
tional arbitration.
40. For the English Arbitration Act, a model most often used in former English
colonies, see INTERNATrONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 16, at Appendix 21.
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ing agreements examined by the author contain international
arbitration. An analysis of licensing contracts of a major devel-
oping country (114 contracts) showed that forty percent of the
dispute settlement provisions are subject to national law and
fifty-four percent are submitted to other jurisdictions, gener-
ally the licensor's country. Additionally, forty percent are sub-
ject to the national jurisdiction, ten percent are subject to the
jurisdiction of another country, and fifty percent are submitted
to international (mostly ICC) arbitration." In petroleum and
nonfuel mineral contracts of the same period, submission to
nonnational law or nonnational jurisdiction is considerably less
frequent.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF DisPuTE SETTLEMENT IN TMCs
Dispute settlement provisions in TMCs reflect the distri-
bution of bargaining power and bargaining skill between the
parties, their specific interests and preferences, and the various
trade-offs in the course of the negotiations leading to the agree-
ment. A considerable evolution in content and sophistication
has taken place in recent years, partly prompted by the in-
creasing success of host countries in achieving permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources.
The crucial decision in negotiating for dispute settlement
is the selection of a specific mechanism to settle disputes gener-
ally by arbitration. The parties often stipulate a number of
other elements concerning the selection of the arbitrators, the
procedure, the choice of applicable law, and issues of enforce-
ability. At first, the selection of arbitration mechanisms is dis-
cussed in terms of current practice, trends, and evaluation of
the host country's negotiating goals. Occasionally, conciliation
is stipulated as a prerequisite to formal arbitration. Express
conciliation provisions, however, are rarely found in TMCs. In
view of the high costs and long delays in arbitration, the parties
have sufficient incentives and opportunities to reach a settle-
ment by informal conciliation without any express stipulations
to this effect.
The main forms of contractual dispute settlement are the
following:
41. These data derive from a confidential analysis of agreements for the transfer
of technology in a developing country adhering in principle to the Calvo doctrine.
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(1) arbitration by an ad hoc tribunal set up in ac-
cordance with the terms of the contract;
(2) specific settlement procedures for disputes of a
primarily technical nature; and
(3) recourse to an institutionalized arbitration tri-
bunal, such as submission to the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the Arbitra-
tion Court of the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC), and the Inter-American Arbitration
Commission.
A. Ad Hoc Arbitration
Ad hoc arbitration according to terms determined by the
agreement itself and without recourse to any institutionalized
arbitration body is the most flexible instrument of dispute set-
tlement. In earlier transnational contracts this form of arbitra-
tion prevailed mostly in a simple and straightforward formula-
tion. Modern contracts use ad hoc arbitration either as the only
form of dispute settlement or as a substitute for recourse to
ICSID, in case such an arbitration tribunal should not be ac-
cessible.
The various terms set forth in the transnational contracts
relating to ad hoc arbitration, such as procedure, choice of law,
and provisions relating to enforcement, have evolved consider-
ably. However, such rules are not a feature unique to ad hoc
arbitration, but will be found also in other forms of institu-
tional arbitration. At the core of ad hoc arbitration is the deter-
mination of the arbitrators. The parties also have considerable
discretion in the selection of arbitrators in institutionalized
arbitration bodies. Yet in contractual ad hoc arbitration, the
greatest variance of various models of selection exists.
Generally, the agreement provides for three arbitrators,
two chosen respectively by either party and the third, often
called "umpire" or "president of the tribunal," named by
agreement of the two arbitrators. Failing such an agreement,
the contract generally provides for a third, neutral authority to
appoint the umpire. The selection of the umpire is of crucial
importance for the role of the dispute settlement provision in
the bargaining relationship between the parties. His decision
is usually decisive, and even the anticipation of such decision
will make the parties stronger or weaker in their demands to-
wards each other. Accordingly, the selection of the neutral ap-
pointing authority also has a considerable weight. The antici-
pation of such authority's choice will influence the parties,
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when they or the arbitrators named by them attempt to agree
by themselves on the person of the umpire. A party, expecting
the appointing authority to select a less favorable umpire, will
have a strong incentive to reach an agreement with the oppo-
nent even on an umpire it would not otherwise accept. Thus,
the supposedly rather neutral selection of an appointing au-
thority may have subtle repercussions on later bargaining pro-
cesses, favoring one party at the expense of another.
It should be emphasized here that the issue of the bias of
arbitrators and umpire is a question of the biases inherent in a
certain legal, cultural, and political background of the arbitra-
tors, rather than a question of impartiality as understood in
legal terminology. The latter question arises in a commercial
arbitration between parties coming from the same legal and
cultural background. In older concession agreements and in
some recent contracts, particularly where the countries are
newcomers as minerals or petroleum producers, the appointing
authority chosen is the International Chamber of Commerce,
the Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID (the
World Bank President), the President or the most senior judge
of the International Court of Justice, the United Nations
Secretary-General, or a board of arbitrators named by the
chairman of a regional development bank.4 2 In recent agree-
ments where the countries have sufficient bargaining power
and experience, there is a strong tendency to keep the appoint-
ing authority in the host country. Accordingly, the president of
the highest national court of Iran or of the Iranian Central
Bank, the Saudi Arabian Board of Concessions Appeals,43 and
the National Chamber of Commerce in Colombia44 have been
42. See, e.g., the contracts between Indonesia and Freeport (1967); Botswana and
Bamangwato (1972); Indonesia and Soriano (1969); Indonesia and Phillips (1975);
Central African Republic and CEA (1969); Indonesia and ALCOA (1969); Indonesia
and Broken Hill (1971); Egypt and Esso (1974); Papua New Guinea and ARCO
(1976); Papua New Guinea and Broken Hill (Dampier) (1976); Papua New Guinea and
Bougainville (1974).
43. Among many other agreements, see, e.g., the Agreement between NIOC and
Ameranda Hess (1971) (Governor of the Central Bank of Iran); the Agreement between
NIOC and Mobil Oil Corp. (1971) (President of the Supreme Court of Iran); the
Agreement between Iran and Japanese Oil Companies (1971). Six more recent petro-
leum service contracts in Iran, dated 1974, follow the same pattern. See also the
Agreement between Petromin and AGIP (1967) (Saudi Board of Concessions Appeals).
See generally Vafai, supra note 38.
44. See the Agreement between Colombia and Hanna (1970); accord, most con-
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stipulated as appointing authorities. Within the long range
between the British Resident in a traditional gulf coast conces-
sion" on one hand and the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
courts on the other hand," such arbitration provisions oriented
towards the host country may be acceptable in the future to
host countries.
Agreements also often stipulate qualifications of the um-
pire, less frequently, those of the arbitrators. Thus, "high repu-
tation in international jurisprudence" and citizenship in a
country other than that of the parties at dispute or of a country
with an economic interest at stake is required. 7 A Colombian
agreement of 1970 requires that the arbitrators and the umpire
be attorneys of the Bogota Bar of Colombian nationality. Thus,
a further element of localization is inserted into the dispute
settlement provisions, reflecting the concern of the Calvo doc-
trine. One should pay some attention in negotiations to the
issues of qualification. As long as traditional international jur-
isprudence is dominated by jurists of Western background, one
might question the value of such qualification. Perhaps qualifi-
cations reflecting an active and expert involvement in legal
issues pertaining to economic development in developing coun-
tries may be of greater importance.
It is not clear whether the arbitrators appointed by the
parties should be as impartial as the umpire or whether they
should basically be seen as representatives of the parties' inter-
ests within the tribunal itself. The position of the ICSID is
apparently to require the impartiality of all arbitrators.48 In
order to avoid a court's vacating an award because of substan-
secutive agreements in petroleum (e.g., Webb, 1973), uranium (e.g. Total, 1976), and
asbestos and coal (Esso, 1976).
45. E.g., the D'Arcy petroleum concession in Kuwait (1934/1955).
46. See the Agreement between Kuwait and Hispanica de Petroleos (1967). Petro-
leum agreements in Peru, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ecuador,
and Colombia exclude any nonnational jurisdiction.
47. See, e.g., the Agreement between Indonesia and Freeport (1967); the Agree-
ment between Papua New Guinea and ARCO (1976); the Agreement between ANCAP
(Uruguay) and Chevron (1969); the Agreement between Indonesia and ALCOA (1969);
the Agreement between Sierra Leone and Selection Trust (1970); the Agreement be-
tween Papua New Guinea and Dampier (1976); the Agreement between Egypt and
Esso (1974).
48. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, done Mar. 18, 1965, art. 14, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No.
6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
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tial defaults in the procedure, the parties might want to make
the arbitrators' position in that respect quite clear.
Sometimes agreements only provide for one arbitrator.
Such a solution may be advisable when a rapid decision is
sought and when the substantial costs of arbitration should be
cut down. It is also possible, as in the OK Tedi contract," to
have a sole arbitrator, but a full three-man tribunal if one
party so requests. A sole arbitrator may also be appointed, if
one party fails to name an arbitrator upon an arbitration re-
quest by the opponent. Such a sole-arbitrator solution appears
to be better than allowing independent authority to name an
arbitrator for the noncooperating party.
Ad hoc arbitration can be an acceptable and effective in-
strument of dispute settlement, especially in the resolution of
minor disputes. It may also be used in third-party decisions in
renegotiation clauses, provided the agreement stipulates ap-
propriate rules for the choice of law, the procedure, and the
enforceability of the award.
As for the second function of arbitration characteristic of
investment contracts in developing countries, ad hoc arbitra-
tion appears to offer less stabilization of the initial terms of the
investment than do institutionalized arbitration tribunals, the
awards of which are bolstered by adverse publicity and the
availability of informal sanctions. A number of host countries
have already achieved an arbitration mechanism, whereby the
inherent biases in favor of the TNE are reduced, the local con-
tent of decisionmaking increased, and the imposition of na-
tional sovereignty restricted. 0 Such ad hoc arbitration with
careful drafting may therefore be a flexible compromise be-
tween such opposed positions as the Calvo doctrine on one side
and the TNE's insistence on complete international arbitration
on the other side. In negotiations, a host country would give
away a valuable bargaining chip without adequate compensa-
49. Agreement between Papua New Guinea and Dampier (1976); Agreement be-
tween Papua New Guinea and Esso (1976); Agreement between Sierra Leone and
Selection Trust (1970).
50. The Colombian arbitration provisions, providing that Colombian law is to be
applied, that the umpire is to be appointed by the Colombian Chamber of Commerce,
and that the arbitrators are to be named from Colombian attorneys of the Bogata Bar,
are examples of such "localization" of arbitration, which is more acceptable to host
countries. See sources cited note 44 supra.
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tion by not strongly insisting on elimination of all nonnational
jurisdiction. Ad hoc arbitration can be an acceptable fallback
position if such insistence bars an agreement.
B. Institutionalized International Arbitration: ICC and
ICSID
Submission to the arbitration provided by the ICC5' occurs
frequently in international commercial transactions and in li-
censing contracts"2 and is occasionally found in mining agree-
ments. As ICC arbitration is often seen as favoring TNEs' in-
terests over host countries' interests and since it seems to be
most appropriate in intrabusiness conflicts, submission to ICC
arbitration often indicates the relatively weak bargaining
power of the host country. It may be, however, that once host
countries have reached a level of bargaining power comparable
to the rather homogeneous situation of TNEs among them-
selves, submission to the ICC will often become acceptable.53
The advantages of ICC arbitration are the institutional frame-
work provided, the existence of well-tested arbitration rules,
and the availability of experienced arbitrators in case the par-
ties do not agree on the umpire. It is claimed that such arbitra-
tion, in contrast to ad hoc arbitration, is able to deal with a
refusal of the defendant to arbitrate. 4 However, appropriate
fashioning of arbitration rules in the agreement, possibly
through incorporation of rules along the lines of the new UN-
CITRAL rules,5 can also deal with the various issues of non-
cooperation of the defendant.
ICC arbitration has been criticized by developing coun-
tries 6 for being too costly, for being too far away from the host
51. For the new ICC arbitration rules, see Eisemann, Le nouveau rdglement
d'arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale, DRorr ET PRAQIUE DU COM-
MERCE INTERNATIONALE 355 (1975). For reference to ICC arbitration clauses, see
Delaume, supra note 36, at 245, 260. ICC arbitration is also stipulated, for example,
in the Falconbridge Agreement with the Dominican Republic (1972), the Agreement
between Ghana and HALCO, the Agreement between CVRD and Finsider, as well as
various Iranian and Algerian service or long term natural gas purchase agreements.
52. An analysis of 30 licensing and transfer of technology agreements in a major
developing country reveals that about 20% of the arbitration clauses stipulate ICC
arbitration.
53. This hypothesis may explain the fact that provision for arbitration by the ICC
has surfaced again in several recent service and sales agreements in Iran and Algeria.
54. See Eisemann, supra note 51, at 355, 357.
55. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/127/ Add.1 (1977).
56. This criticism has also been voiced to the author in various interviews with
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country, and for taking no account of the restricted means,
qualified personnel, and facilities available to developing coun-
tries when involved in international arbitration proceedings.
Concerning the crucial selection of the umpire or sole arbitra-
tor, many developing countries feel that it is unlikely that the
personality chosen will be favorable to the aspirations of devel-
oping countries to reform the often lopsided initial terms of an
investment by legitimate adjustment. Doubts concerning the
suspected systemic bias of ICC umpires and ICC rules tradi-
tionally favoring the position of TNEs are not alleviated by the
possibility of the parties' agreement upon the umpire. The an-
ticipated appointment by the ICC arbitration court will, as
explained above, sway the bargaining process for agreement on
the umpire in favor of the investor. It is questionable if consul-
tation of national chambers of commerce in the course of the
selection of the umpire (articles 2 and 6 of the ICC rules) will
be sufficient to eliminate such suspicions. Accordingly, sub-
mission to ICC arbitration, even if it provides effective dispute
settlement for minor disputes, may entail a propensity to stabi-
lize the initial contractual terms against demands for renego-
tiation by the host country.
After the establishment of the ICSID in 1965, submission
to this arbitration institution replaced other common forms of
dispute settlement.5" It is found in many transnational mineral
contracts with the notable exception of those involving Latin
American countries and some other countries with a strong
concern for national sovereignty."8 Insofar as recognition and
negotiators from developing countries.
57. From 1965 to the present, more than 67 states have become members of the
ICSID. Curiously, the quantity of legal literature concerning the ICSID is inversely
proportional to the number of cases decided by it. See J. CHERIAN, INVESTMENT CON-
TRACTS AND ARBITRATION: THE WORLD BANK CONVENTION ON THE SETrLEMENT OF INVEST-
MENT DISPuTES (1975). Seventy-two states have become signatories to the Convention,
and 67 have deposited instruments of ratification. ICSID/3/Rev. 18 (1976). For provi-
sions relating to the role of the ICSID in international agreements and national invest-
ment laws, see ICSID/9/Rev. 2 (1976). For actions taken by contracting states pursuant
to the Convention, see ICSID/8/Rev. 3 (1976). The 1976 Report of the ICSID recites
that five cases had been submitted that year, of which three, involving Alcoa, Kaiser,
and Reynolds, have meanwhile been withdrawn by the parties following the renegotia-
tion of their agreements in 1976 and 1977.
58. Agreements which refer to the ICSID are the following: the Agreement be-
tween Mauritania and SOMIMA (1967); the Agreement between Ivory Coast and
UNIWAX (1968); various Indonesian and Liberian agreements of recent date; and the
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enforcement are concerned, the ICSID arbitration appears to
be more effective than other forms of dispute settlement: a
material reexamination of the arbitral award by the courts of
member states of the convention is excluded, and a state can
no longer raise the objection of sovereign immunity against
arbitral proceedings. The United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
1958 provides a smaller degree of effectiveness. 9 The Jamaica
v. ALCOA decision rendered by an ICSID tribunal has more-
over clearly stated that submission to ICSID creates an irre-
vocable international obligation which cannot be affected by
subsequent withdrawal. 0 As for practical advantages of the
ICSID arbitration, questions might be raised concerning the
speed of the proceedings."' Most of the few cases brought
before the ICSID tribunal to the present have been withdrawn
after settlement has been reached among the parties. The
performance of the ICSID suggests that the tribunal is a
mechanism too wieldy and complicated to achieve speedy and
amicable decisions which can act as a guideline for the con-
tinuing implementation of the contract. Some forms of ad hoc
arbitration, such as specific settlement of technical disputes
by experts' decisions and even ICC arbitration, may provide
faster relief at least in the area of minor disputes. As far as
the major disputes are concerned, the specific advantages of
Agreement between Botswana and Bamangwato (1972). Agreements related to several
Latin American countries occasionally contain provisions for arbitration. For example,
a Brazilian iron ore contract of 1973 requires submission to the ICC; a Uruguyan
contract for petroleum (1975) stipulates to ad hoc arbitration; the Cerro Colorado
Agreement (Panama 1974) mandates ICAC arbitration; while Colombian agree-
ments, see sources cited note 44, supra, provide for national arbitration. No Latin
American agreement providing for submission to the ICSID, however, has come to the
attention of the author; most Latin American countries have not acceded to the ICSID
Convention.
59. "Recognition and Enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if
• . . the'recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country." Article V(2), U.N. Register of Texts of Conventions and Other
Instruments Concerning International Trade Law, U.N. Doc. E/73/v.3/24, 26 (1973).
60. See Schmidt, supra note 30; Coll, United States Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards Against Sovereign States: Implications of the ICSID Convention, 17 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 401 (1976).
61. The two ICSID cases reported in the Annual Reports of the ICSID from 1972
to 1976 have, as of the date of the 1976 Annual Report of the ICSID, not yet been
resolved. The Jamaica bauxite cases have been withdrawn.
1977
56 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
an ICSID clause for the investor is the strong incentive for the
host country to respect the initial terms of the agreement. 2
It appears that ICSID submission has a rather strong effect
in deterring renegotiation or at least in providing the investor,
as in the Jamaica case, a bargaining chip vis-A-vis the host
country. Arbitral awards issued under the auspices of the
World Bank are regarded by developing countries as carrying
considerable weight. It is expected that these awards would
have adverse effects on future investment, on the credit rating
of the host country, and on the World Bank's readiness to grant
further financing. 3 The high visibility of ICSID decisions (the
"goldfish bowl effect") acts as a strong incentive in stablizing
the initial contract terms. Some recent contracts expressly aim
at reaping the benefits of such adverse publicity by stipulating,
contrary to all contract and amicable arbitration tradition,
that the investor may publish the award. Such a clause" is
indicative of the stablizing function ascribed by investors to
the ICSID tribunal. The provision reflects rather clearly the
preponderance of the function of an "investment protection"
in international arbitration over the traditional function of
international commercial arbitration, the inducement to
achieve a mutually acceptable and nondisruptive settlement.
Lastly, there is some concern in developing countries over
the selection of arbitrators by the ICSID. As with the ICC, it
is feared that the exercise of the appointing authority by the
ICSID will more likely result in the selection of an umpire with
a "systemic," not a personal, bias in favor of Western legal
concepts and the position of TNEs. It has been suggested 5 that
the ICSID roster of personalities contains little reference to
legal experts generally representing the developing countries'
position in the relevant areas of international business law.
(Such a gap is also obviously due to the organizational and
62. Schmidt, supra note 30, perceives stabilization and deterrence against the
demands of renegotiation as the major characteristic of arbitration under the ICSID.
63. See Spofford, Third Party Judgments and Economic Transactions, 1964-I1
RECUEIL DES COURS 108, 224. Interviews with negotiators for TNEs confirm 'that this
expectation is one of the major advantages seen to accrue to them from an ICSID
arbitration provision.
64. The Agreement between Botswana and Bamangwato (1972), notable for its
strong provisions guarding against subsequent legislation by the host country affecting
the investment, contains such a clause.
65. Interview with a host country negotiator.
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financial weakness of the developing countries' institutions
devoted to international legal research as compared to Western
countries' institutions.) Developing countries are consequently
underrepresented in the often decisive communication pro-
cesses of the international legal community. An additional fac-
tor is the developing countries' dependence on the traditions
and institutions of Western legal scholarship, particularly on
those of the former colonial mother countries.
In evaluating the ability of the institutional forms of dis-
pute settlement to fulfill the various functions outlined above,
we can conclude the following: Insofar as issues of interpreta-
tive and technical disputes in' the minor conflicts are con-
cerned, the ICSID and the ICC tribunals do not appear to be
considerably better equipped than ad hoc arbitration. Such
arbitration, which can be drafted to be rapid and closer to the
parties, may be expected to produce an atmosphere conducive
to amicable settlement. Against noncooperative parties, the
institutionalized arbitration may offer certain advantages. A
careful drafting of arbitration provisions in ad hoc arbitration
and the use of the growing regional arbitration centers may,
however, yield similar results. Lastly, the premise that arbitra-
tion is always superior to judicial decisionmaking may be ques-
tioned. On the contrary, international arbitration may be more
expensive and less rapid than judicial proceedings, as one com-
mentator has observed.6 As is true with large-scale interna-
tional arbitration cases, neither speed, efficiency, nor inexpen-
siveness may be particular qualities of this form of dispute
settlement. Specific obstacles of international arbitration
may include the various factors to be negotiated, the frequent
lack of expertise among arbitrators chosen for their high social
reputation, the age of arbitrators, and the various possibilities
of protracting the proceedings by an uncooperative arbitrator.
The main function of ICC and ICSID arbitration is to pre-
serve the initial contract terms against the contract revision
66. See Layton, Arbitration in International Commercial Agreements: The Noose
Draws Tighter, 9 INT'L LAW. 741, 745 (1975).
67. The history of the few large-scale petroleum arbitration cases, such as those
involving Abu Dhabi, Quatar, Sapphire and Aramco, see sources cited note 3, supra,
suggests that speed and economy are not among the principal advantages of interna-
tional arbitration.
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demands by the host country and to bestow an element of
bargaining power on the TNE in later renegotiations. Hence it
is less the incentive towards amicable settlement and more the
strong sanction against host country's attempts to change the
rules of the game which is appreciated in such forms of dispute
settlement." This assumption is supported by a number of
interviews with company negotiators.
C. Settlement of Technical Disputes by Experts' Decision
A very interesting and new development is the quantita-
tive and qualitative expansion of specific procedures to solve
disputes of a technical character. Many disputes in mineral
agreements are primarily of a technical nature; they cannot be
resolved by legal reasoning, but rather by application of profes-
sional standards, such as "sound engineering, mining, or ac-
counting practices." A quick resolution of such disputes is of
great importance, particularly when a decision is necessary in
order to carry out the implementation of a mining project.
Technical disputes may also involve substantial financial in-
terests. Accordingly, agreements increasingly provide for the
decision of a single expert or a mining, engineering, consulting,
or accounting firm in the listed areas: 9
(1) application of sound mining and engineering
standards in the construction and operation of facili-
ties;
(2) safeguarding of environmental standards;
(3) application of "arm's-length standards in intra-
company transactions," particularly in pricing of
minerals;
(4) accounting issues, such as deductability and
computation of exploration costs; and
(5) acceptance of a feasibility study.
68. This probably explains why international arbitration became one of the chief
causes for the breakdown of otherwise promising negotiations in a significant negotia-
tion between an Asian host country and a major mining company. It is interesting to
note that a later agreement for the exploitation of the mine in question did contain
those precise dispute settlement provisions which the host country objected to in its
negotiations with the first negotiating partner.
69. For the decisions of experts in older petroleum concessions, see Fischer, supra
note 20, at 261. Such clauses allowing for the decisions of experts exist in the Agree-
ment between Iran and the Middle East Petroleum Consortium (1954) and the Sap-
phire Agreement. See Lalive, supra note 13, at 1003. A recent Iranian agreement
provides for technical settlement of disputes concerning the computation of explora-
tion costs, while a diamond agreement provides the same for accounting issues and
arm's-length pricing standards. Also, an Iranian exploration agreement and the Papua
New Guinea-Dampier contract of 1976 stipulate decisions by experts on the question
of the acceptability of the feasibility study.
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Specific settlement of technical disputes may constitute
an area where the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of national
courts does not apply, as the necessary technical expertise may
often not be available. A host country desiring to maintain its
unimpaired national jurisdiction may accordingly consent to
submit narrowly defined technical matters to technical arbitra-
tion or an expert's decision. Such a solution can accommodate
the investor's interest in securing a forum which protects him
from the discretionary technical judgements of the govern-
ment.
The criteria for the experts' decision are usually described
by reference to accepted professional standards. The profes-
sional reputation of the consulting firm at stake is a strong
incentive for the experts to abide by those standards. However,
objections are raised against a mere referral to such standards
and against a selection of consulting firms as experts, based
upon an allegedly inherent bias of such firms and their profes-
sional standards in favor of the business practices of TNEs.
The professional criteria of experts are geared to the specific
needs of business and stockholders, but do not take account of
the specific interest of the host country, as reflected in the
agreement.70 As long as the major consulting and engineering
firms called in as experts have strong and well-established ties
with the major mining companies, they may have a disincen-
tive to decide against them. Even in experts' decisions, the
room for value judgement is rather large, as the differences of
asset valuation in a major litigation related to mining in Zam-
bia illustrate.71 Accordingly, negotiators for developing coun-
tries have insisted that the host country retain the power to
decide on the standards of accounting applicable by issuing
pertinent regulations. The recent OK Tedi copper contract sets
forth a very interesting set of criteria to be used in arbitration
in a dispute concerning the feasibility study. The criteria merit
literal quotation:
70. See U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Transnational Corporations, Some Aspects
of Corporate Accounting and Reporting of Special Interest to Developing Host Coun-
tries, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC.1/4 (1976); U.N. ESCOR Commission on Transnational
Corporations, Towards International Standards of Accounting and Reporting for
Transnational Corporations: Report of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC.1/2
(1976).
71. Kohn v. American Metals Climax, 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
1977
60 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
In reaching his decision on any matter referred to him . . . the
arbitrator shall judge the reasonableness of any decision of the
State having regard to whether the proposals are based on sound
mining and engineering practice, take reasonable account of the
interests of the people of Papua New Guinea and of employees
who will be working on the Project, include reasonable steps to
protect the environment, are consistent with securing an equita-
ble return on investment to the Company having regard to the
risks associated with the Project and the efficient development
and maintenance of the Project and are not inconsistent with the
balanced development of the area, recognizing the limited pres
ent use of the area, the need for its development, the State's
desire for the Project to proceed and be economically viable, and
the effect the Project must necessarily have on the environment.
In drafting such standards some reference to the weight of
these variant, often conflicting standards should be given. The
OK Tedi contract reflects the evolution of standards of social
and financial accounting which take account of the special
needs of developing countries. 2
The negotiators should also consider whether the expert's
decision is to be final, or, as proposed in a model engineering
contract, whether it should be possible to appeal the final
decision awarding monetary compensation to the injured
party. 3 If technical and legal arbitration is stipulated sepa-
rately, some thought should be given to ensure an appropriate
division of jurisdiction. The awkward situation, familiar in sev-
eral publicized international arbitration cases, in which legal
experts deal with matters of high technical intricacies or when
technical experts decide legal issues should be avoided.
V. SPECIFIC ISSUES IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROVISIONS
Besides the choice of the arbitration forum, the contract-
ing parties can stipulate various conditions and rules concern-
ing the arbitration. Such issues can be relevant in all the forms
72. See sources cited note 70 supra.
73. U.N. Industrial Development Organization, Guidelines for Contracting for
Industrial Projects in Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ID/149, at 57 (1975). Other less
significant details to be taken into consideration include whether the expert's decision
may be overridden by a panel of three experts upon the request of one party, as is the
case in a 1968 Ethiopian contract, and how questions of a legal and technical nature
are to be separated for arbitration. The Agreement between Algeria and CREPS (1966)
apparently permits the party requesting arbitration to select the avenue of dispute
settlement. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 415.
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of arbitration discussed. The method of issue resolution in the
transnational contract will have a bearing upon the arbitration
and, by anticipation, will affect the parties' behavior in the on-
going bargaining process during the course of the life of the
contract.
A. Place and Language of the Arbitration
The place stipulated for arbitration is often quite indica-
tive of the power distribution between host country and TNE.
The company will favor and possibly obtain locations such as
Stockholm, Paris, Zirich, and Geneva, whereas the host coun-
try, for reasons of supposed local advantage, but particularly
for reasons of lesser costs and increased familiarity, will negoti-
ate for its home capital or at least a neighboring capital. The
host country may be at quite a disadvantage in an unfamiliar
environment with its limited financial resources and its limited
know-how in international business customs. There are a num-
ber of compromises available. One agreement provides for the
capital of the respective defendant as the place of arbitration,
while another grants the investor the right to choose a place
other than the host country's capital, providing the investor
pays the extra costs involved. Respect for the investor's. un-
willingness to go to arbitration in the host country capital may
lead to stipulation of a neighboring capital or, increasingly, of
one of the regional arbitration centers.
The issue of the language of the arbitration is similar.
Arbitration in a foreign language proceeding may prove disad-
vantageous for the host country. Accordingly, it will try to re-
quire that its own language be the language in which the pro-
ceedings are conducted. Such issues are of interest to the host
country's negotiators. One should, however, not pay attention
to securing a bargaining victory on one of these more symbolic
issues in return for major concessions in areas of financial con-
cern.
B. Arbitration and the Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts
Host countries will generally prefer complete national ju-
risdiction to the exclusion of international arbitration. In petro-
leum contracts any other solution appears to be antiquated."
74. Recent arbitration clauses reviewed by the author in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ku-
wait, Algeria, Libya, Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia reflect a quite clear and definite
trend toward an exclusive application of national law at least in petroleum contracts.
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In nonfuel minerals agreements host countries, particularly in
Latin America, have been increasingly successful in insisting
on national jurisdiction. 5 OPEC resolutions, the ANCOM de-
cision, Decision 24, various national laws, and international
legal instruments prohibit or at least recommend against sub-
mission to nonnational jurisdictions. 6 Sometimes when the
investor's bargaining power precludes complete national juris-
diction, elaborate theories have been developed to justify sub-
mission to international arbitration. One theory restricts the
Calvo doctrine to agreements performed within the country
and thus exempts agreements containing financing obtained
from foreign sources." In the conflict between the objective of
complete national sovereignty and the need to attract suffi-
cient foreign capital, a number of intermediate solutions have
recently evolved. Such solutions are possible compromises and
fall-back positions for the parties in the negotiations. The
main characteristic of such arrangements is the division of ju-
risdictions and of subject matters among municipal courts,
national and international arbitration tribunals, and specific
proceedings for technical disputes.
The role of settlement of technical disputes has already
been discussed. Some agreements allow a request for arbitra-
tion only after exhaustion of local remedies. This transfers into
contractual terms the traditional doctrine of international law
that diplomatic support by the home country requires a pre-
vious "denial of justice" by the host country." The Cerro Colo-
75. Almost all the recent nonfuel agreements known to the author and relating to
Latin America, in particular the Peruvian, Chilean, and Colombian copper and nickel
contracts, contain provisions requiring complete submission to national law and juris-
diction.
76. See sources cited note 15, supra; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries, Resolution XVI.90 (1968), reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1183 (1968);
Andean Foreign Investment Code, July 17, 1971, art. 51, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 126, 141 (1972). The Andean Code was originally adopted on Dec. 31, 1970,
by Decision No. 24 of the Commission of the Cartegena Agreement (Acuerdo de Car-
tegena or Andean Pact), for which see Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration,
done May 26, 1969, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 910 (1969). See also Danino, The Andean
Code After Five Years, 8 LAw. AM. 635, 667-68 (1976).
77. Thus, a Peruvian petroleum agreement with certain Japanese companies is
expressly subject to Japanese and English law and to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Tokyo. The justification for imposition of the Calvo doctrine arises by creating an
exception for contracts performed in a foreign country.
78. E.g., the uranium Agreement between Colombia and Total (1976). For the
concept that diplomatic intervention is permissable only in the event of a denial of
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rado Copper Agreement of 1976 confers on the courts of Pan-
ama the jurisdiction to issue execution awards. Additionally,
several recent contracts in copper and petroleum from Papua
New Guinea require the arbitration tribunal to allow the muni-
cipal court to decide on issues of municipal law. Apparently,
the tribunal has to stay the proceedings and request a ruling
on the municipal law upon which to base its decision on issues
of local law raised during arbitration. Other agreements, such
as recent Liberian concession contracts and the Bamangwato
Agreement of 1972 in Botswana, exempt matters of national
law or certain narrowly defined disputes from the tribunal's
jurisdiction. In various recent Papua New Guinean contracts
and other agreements from anglophonic developing countries,
tax disputes are generally excluded from the contractual
mechanism for dispute settlement. In Egyptian petroleum
concessions disputes with the government are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts, whereas disputes
with the national petroleum enterprise are submitted to arbi-
tration.79
Accordingly, the host country's strategy for negotiation
might be to reduce the procedural role and the subject matter
of jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal. Questions of the in-
terplay between local courts and the tribunal would have to be
clarified more than has been done previously in the several
recent agreements containing such provisions. If the municipal
courts are to be competent for the execution of awards, it is
necessary to clarify whether they are exclusively competent or
whether the winning party may appeal to other countries'
courts to enforce the award. In view of the public policy reser-
vation of article V(2)(d) of the 1958 United Nations Convention
exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts of the host country
to enforce an international arbitral award may make quite a
difference. If disputes concerning the proper application of
municipal law are at issue, the role of the arbitration tribunal
must be defined. The intent of the respective clauses is to allow
the local courts to decide. One possible solution might be to
require the arbitration tribunal to stay its proceedings on the
request of one party or at its own discretion, while the compe-
justice, see Fatouros, supra note 29, at 251.
79. See the Agreement between Egypt and Exxon (1974) and other Egyptian
petroleum contracts,
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tent municipal courts decide on the legal question involved.80
Another arrangement would be to leave the complete jurisdic-
tion over the operating company incorporated in the host coun-
try to the local courts, but stipulate international arbitration
for disputes concerning the contract with the foreign parent
company."
Finally, it is possible to divide the subject matter of poten-
tial disputes into issues where national sovereignty is con-
cerned and other issues where the essence of the investment of
the TNE is at stake. The bulk of such disputes may be subject
to exclusive national jurisdiction, whereas disputes concerning
the "heart" of the investment may be submitted to interna-
tional arbitration. Such was a proposal put forth by a major
mining company in a recent negotiation where arbitration was
a controversial issue. The "essence" of the investment requires
further clarification. Perhaps only a dispute concerning a claim
for damages for material breach of contract after termination
could be left as the only major dispute to nonnational arbitra-
tion.
Another compromise solution is the "localization" of arbi-
tration as described above. Such national arbitration proceed-
ings could for some disputes (mainly the "minor" ones) provide
an atmosphere conducive to amicable settlement without af-
fecting national sovereignty. Innovative and careful drafting of
dispute settlement provisions will probably increase in order to
take account of the national sovereignty interest as well as of
the legitimate interests of investors.
C. Applicable Law and Substantive Rules Governing
Arbitration
If parties stipulate legal rules applicable to the contract,
either in arbitration or without normal judicial proceedings,
three issues may be distinguished: (1) the choice-of-law
question; (2) the "freezing" of a particular legal regime; and
(3) the insertion of specific rules concerning the substance of
80. Cf. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, also found in 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 4655, at 3853,
which requires national courts to submit issues of European law to the European Court
in Luxembourg.
81. Such was the proposal put forward by a major mining company in recent
negotiations. The company wished to reserve at least the "essence of the investment"
for a nonnational tribunal.
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the award, substituting existent or nonexistent law of trans-
national contracts.
The choice-of-law question must be examined before the
background of a possible unilateral change of the terms by the
host country through legislation. The stipulation of a legal sys-
tem other than the host country's, or of vaguely defined, gener-
ally recognized legal rules of international law, is meant to
protect in a doubtful way the legal regime of the project against
such alteration. Freezing clauses are addressed to this issue of
subsequent unilateral alteration even more directly.
Apart from this background, the choice-of-law question is
related to the absence of particular rules appropriate to trans-
national investment contracts, either in the legal systems of
host countries or in the often invoked international law.2 The
specific problems raised by transnational investment have not
yet led to an elaboration of rules, standards, and norms applic-
able either in the national laws and regulations or in interna-
tional law, which is based primarily on interstate relations.
This situation has led to an increase of substantive rules of
contract law generated by the contracts themselves. In combi-
nation with the growth of specific investment laws83 and inter-
national legal instruments applicable to TNEs and transfer of
technology, 4 future rules may slowly bring about a transna-
tional law of investment contracts.8 5
82. See Weil, supra note 3, at 118 and passim. International law has developed
to the extent of coping adequately with international treaties between states, but not
agreements between states and private corporations. The most crucial issue is that of
a unilateral alteration of the contract by legislation of a sovereign state. Rules relating
to this issue have been proposed by Western jurists in the form of an analogy to the
traditional standards governing nationalization. But apart from this problem, many
other problems concerning the law of international investment contracts, for example,
the calculation of the amount of damages and the impact of changed circumstances,
have not yet reached the stage of international consensus which can be characterized
as a new "international law of transnational investment contracts."
83. See the survey on National Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transna-
tional Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/8 (1976).
84. See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Work Related to the Formu-
lation of a Code of Conduct: Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the
Code of Conduct (3d Sess., Agenda Item 5) 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/31 (1977); An Inter-
national Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/ AC.1/2
(Supp. 1) (1975).
85. See Kahn, Probl~mes Juridiques de l'Invetissement dans les Pays de
I'ancienne Afrique francaise, 1965 JOURNAL DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 338; Schachter,
The EvolvingInternational Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976).
See also P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); Lalive, supra note 13.
1977
66 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Traditionally, foreign investors have mostly been able to
have a choice-of-law clause reflecting their interests. These
choices include the law of a foreign (home) country, interna-
tional law (however vague), or generally recognized legal prin-
ciples (emanating from the legal systems of capital-exporting
countries). Such choice-of-law solutions also reflect several
well-known arbitration cases where a set of rules taken from
Western legal systems,"6 rather than from the often nonexistent
law of the host country, was applied. Even today, the choice
of a foreign law or other nonnational legal rules is predominant
in manufacturing, in licensing, and particularly in loan agree-
ments.Y The development, however, is clearly directed towards
exclusive application of national law of the host country. At
first, national law is stipulated together with traditional refer-
ences of a vague content, such as generally recognized princi-
ples of international law.88 In petroleum agreements of major
producing countries any reference except to national law is by
now antiquated. 0
The problem of "freezing clauses" is somewhat different.
Such clauses contained in a large number of recent agree-
ments and several modern investment laws8 ' guarantee the in-
86. Such as those "generally recognized principles" found in the law common to
civilized nations and comparative jurisprudence. See sources cited note 3, supra; Sur-
atgar, Considerations Affecting Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts between Govern-
ments and Foreign Nationals, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 273, 283 (1962); Lalive, supra note
13, at 998.
87. This conclusion was reached following an analysis by the author of various
large-scale investment finance agreements. See also G. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOWu DEVELOPMENT FINANCING (1967); G. DELAUME,
TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPucABLE LAw AND SETTLEMENT OF DisPUnES ch. VI (1976)..
88. It is possible now to state fairly that the application of national law prevails
in most major petroleum producing countries and increasingly in nonfuel mineral
agreements as well. But cf. Sarre, Arbitration Clauses in the Oil Industry in the Middle
East, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 16, at 336, 341, 344.
89. See the Agreement between Sierra Leone and Selection Trust (1970) and the
Agreement between Indonesia and ALCOA (1969). Also, article 42 of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes provides that arbitrators
are to apply municipal law and international law as appropriate in the event that no
specific stipulation exists in the agreement.
90. See note 88 supra.
91. A formulation to the effect that only such national law as may b4 "consistent
with the agreement" shall apply is found in the Agreement between Papua New
Guinea and Dampier (1976), the Agreement between Liberia and Lamco, the Agree-
ment between Liberia and Bong, and the Agreement between Panama and Texasgulf
(1976). Contracts entered into by Francophonic countries in Africa abound with
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alterability of the complete contractual and legal regime for the
project. This includes certain tax rules, the tax rate, foreign
currency exchange, and the overall financial burden. Other
provisions guarantee that new taxes will not be imposed or that
any subsequent legislation affecting the agreement's financial
character will not be applicable. Francophonic African coun-
tries have been particularly ready to grant wide and long-
ranging privileges to TNEs. In its softer forms the freezing
clauses stipulate that municipal law will be applicable only as
far as it is consistent with the agreement. In its more severe
forms any subsequent legislation affecting the contract is de-
clared to be a material breach giving rise to claims for damages.
As modern agreements tend to govern comprehensively all con-
ditions of the mining project, the hands of national legislators
would be tied for twenty-five to forty years. It is practically
impossible for a developing country to abide by such a freezing
clause for the whole life of the contract. Moreover, it is doubtful
if such provisions can produce a legally binding effect on the
host country's exercise of national sovereignty by subsequent
legislation. It is claimed that the host country's right to legis-
late is inalienable and that provisions stipulating a law differ-
ent from the host country's laws merely incorporate specific
rules contained in another legal system. These rules are amena-
guarantees that no subsequent legislation will have any effect upon the investment in
areas mentioned generally and specifically. The Agreement between Botswana and
Bamangwato (1972) is perhaps the most carefully drafted in this respect, for it deems
any subsequent change in the legislative regime governing the instrument to be a
"material breach of the contract." See also the Agreement between Surinam and
ALCOA (1958) and the Brokopondo Agreement.
A number of investment laws also guarantee the tax rate, the overall tax burden,
and an exemption from other fiscal exactions for a considerable period of time, often
for the entire term of the investment agreement to be concluded. Illustrative is the
Chilean Foreign Investment Statute, Decreto Ley No. 1748, Official Gazette (March
18, 1977), which entitles foreign investors to the inclusion of a clause in their agreement
freezing taxes for 10 years. Article 8 of the Act states that sales, service, and import
tax exemptions will remain unvaried throughout the term of the agreement. It is
interesting to note that a number of mineral agreements concluded under the prior
investment statute, Decreto Ley No. 600 (1974), during 1976 and 1977 provide for a
freezing of the fiscal regime governing the mining project for a period of 30 years
following the start of commercial production. A review of legislative changes and
renegotiations reveals that such freezing clauses have rarely prevented a revision of the
terms of the investment when the government acquires an equality or even superiority
in its bargaining position in comparison to its previously inferior position. Wfilde,
Revision of Transnational Investment Agreements, 10 LAW. AM. (forthcoming 1978).
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ble to alteration by subsequent legislation . 2 Such a view is
strongly supported by authoritative statements of the United
Nations, particularly the resolutions on the New International
Economic Order and the recommendations of the Group of
Eminent Persons.93
Consequently, the effect of freezing clauses is rather ques-
tionable de facto as well as de jure. They may mainly serve the
investors' bargaining position against future expected renego-
tiation demands. Applying the evolving transnational law of
investment contracts, one may suggest that freezing clauses are
void and that courts, acting under the public policy reservation
of the 1958 United Nations Convention, should refuse to en-
force arbitral awards based on such freezing provisions. The
evolution of several large-scale concessions suggests that freez-
ing clauses and legal enclaves for natural resource exploitation
may be antiquated and that the agreement will increasingly be
subject to laws of general application in the host country. 4 The
92. See Brown, Choice of Law Provisions in Concession and Related Contracts,
39 MoD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976); Geiger, The Unilateral Change of Economic Development
Agreements, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 73 (1974); Zakharyia, Impact of Changing Cir-
cumstances on the Revision of Petroleum Contracts, 12 MmD. EAST ECON. SURVEY 1
(July 11, 1969 Supp.); Rouhani, Assignment and Renegotiation, in NEGOTIATION AND
DRAFTING OF MnIo AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 21 (1976); Suratgar, supra note 86,
at 305.
However, the most recent arbitration decision recognizes a stabilization clause
and declares a subsequent nationalization void. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co.
v. Libya, in 104 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 350 (1977), and Lalive, Un grand
arbitrage petrolier entre un Gouvernement et deux societes privees etrangeres. Id. at
319. The arbitration took place without the participation of Libya. It is not apparent
that the comprehensive protection of foreign investment from nationalization and
adjustment of petroleum concession granted by the sole arbitrator, Rene-Jean Dupuy,
is the best way of achieving the international legal principles universally accepted by
TNEs and host countries; if the rules evolved by arbitrators reflect only the interests
favoring comprehensive protection of TNEs and not the requirements of host countries
for flexibility, then such rules do not seem to offer a promise of universal acceptance
and thus universal effectiveness.
93. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975);
G.A. Res. 3202, 6 U.N. GAOR (Special Sess.), Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); Summary of the Hearings Before the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the
Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations
37, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/15 (1974); Commission on Transnational Corporations, Work
Related to the Formulation of a Code of Conduct: Report of the Intergovernmental
Working Group on the Code of Conduct 7, 3d Sess. (Agenda Item 5), U.N. Doc.
E/C.10/31 (1977); UNCTAD, Progress in Implementing Resolution 39 (III), Report by
the Secretariat, in 2 Trade and Development Board (Prov. Agenda Item 5) 12, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/AC.11/12 (1972).
94. E.g., such is the development of a traditional concession like the Firestone
concession in Liberia, which began in 1926 as a 99 year concession with full enclave
VOL. 7:33
TRANSNATIONAL MINERAL CONTRACTS
current practice of freezing clauses may, therefore, be inter-
preted as a reflection of the very weak bargaining power of host
countries trying to attract investment at all costs. This course
of action will not stop the trend towards submission to national
laws once a level of experience and bargaining power has been
reached .
Another trend to be examined is the increase of provisions
setting down substantive rules for the arbitration tribunal.
Such a development stems from the absence of substantive
legal rules in international law and in the municipal law of
most countries that are able to deal with complex foreign in-
vestment contracts of a private and administrative law nature.
Additionally, the vagueness of the various choice-of-law provi-
sions and of the legal systems mentioned may motivate the
parties to set forth precisely which standards the arbitrators
should apply. Some agreements require the tribunal to give the
party in default sufficient time to remedy the breach. On the
contrary, others allow only final termination of the contract
and an award of damages to the party injured. An interesting
clause in a recent copper contract limits the amount of possible
damage which can be awarded to the total amount of manage-
ment fees to be paid within eighteen months. It may be ex-
pected in the future that the contracts will contain specific
legal regimes governing the damages and consequences of de-
fault, along with a more precise definition of default and the
right of the tribunal to issue interim awards and to order spe-
cific performance. Such precise contractual stipulations may
reduce risks and increase the predictability for both parties. In
addition the more arbitration is governed by precise standards,
the less parties will be afraid to submit to an unpredictable,
foreign-based insitution.
status and which was made subject to general taxation in 1976. Developed producer
countries, such as South Africa and the provincial governments of Canada and Aus-
tralia, have progressed on this path to subject the mining industry to general laws
much more than have developing countries.
95. Most of the elaborate freezing provisions and guarantees in agreements and
investment laws appear to have come from countries with a low level of development
and experience, anxious to attract foreign investment at any cost, or from countries
with weak bargaining power caused by temporary or permanent, unfavorable economic
conditions. Such countries can hardly serve as an indicator of future trends or as an
example for the negotiation strategies of host countries.
1977
70 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
D. Procedure of Arbitration
The rules governing the arbitration proceedings may be
drafted in the agreement. These include time limits, voting
requirements in the case of a three-person tribunal, cost appor-
tionment, decision on default, and other issues. In case an in-
stitutional arbitration tribunal is chosen the rules of such an
institution as the ICC, the ICSID, or a regional arbitration
institution will apply. It is also possible to incorporate the rules
of such an institution into ad hoc arbitration clauses. It ap-
pears that ICSID rules are more appropriate for large-scale
arbitration in important disputes often terminating the agree-
ment, but too cumbersome and time consuming to achieve a
speedy settlement. For disputes described as "technical"
ICSID arbitration is inappropriate. Developing countries have
raised against rules such as the time limits issued by the ICC
the objection that they are not responsive to their needs."
There are efforts to induce the arbitration centers to respond
to those requests and to foster regional arbitration centers in
developing countries.9"
The 1976 UNCITRAL rules for incorporation in ad hoc
arbitration clauses are of particular interest for dispute settle-
ment in transnational mineral contracts. These rules have been
recommended for US-USSR trade. 8 They appear to be most
useful for large-scale arbitation in investment contracts. Some
doubts, however, must be raised against article 33(II), where
the tribunal is requested to decide "in accordance with the
contract." Some modification, such as a clause requiring that
the tribunal "shall take into account the terms of contract"
may have been more appropriate to a long term investment
contract. 9 Perhaps a contractual stipulation to that effect in
the dispute settlement clause may be useful in making the
UNCITRAL rules appropriate not only for international com-
mercial contracts, but also for long term investment agree-
ments. The UNCITRAL rules also deal with the important
96. See the Note by the Secretariat on the decision by the Asian-African Commit-
tee on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/127 and Add. 1
(1976/1977).
97. Id.
98. See Press Release of the American Arbitration Association (January 12, 1977).
99. See, e.g., Article 38 of the Arbitration Rules of the U.N. ECE of 1966, U.N.
Register of Texts E/73/V/3 at 106.
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practical issue of protraction of the proceedings by one party's
appointed arbitrator. One of the major obstacles against a
speedy completion of the arbitration proceedings is, in addition
to a delay by the obstructing party in its appointment of an
arbitrator, the noncooperation of an arbitrator already ap-
pointed. °0
E. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The weakness of arbitral awards relative to judicial deci-
sions is often a great difficulty, along with the expenses and
time delays involved in enforcing the award. When the defen-
dant is a state, an attempt to execute the award is confronted
with the objection of sovereign immunity. As the contracting
party from a developing country will most likely be the state,
some state agency, or state enterprise, sovereign immunity will
often become an issue. This occurs particularly when the new
government refuses to comply with the commitments of the
former government. Recently, the Nigerian cement cases have
triggered a lively discussion of these problems.' The United
Nations Convention of 1958 on Recognition and Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards may be of some use in overcoming such
obstacles. However, it allows for reservations of public policy
and does not deal expressly with sovereign immunity. Efforts
are underway to impove the effectiveness of this Convention in
light of the growing number of developing countries that have
acceded to it.102 The ICSID probably provides the most effec-
tive instruments for the enforcement of its awards.
The parties themselves have the potential to reduce the
obstacles against enforcement. They may stipulate that the
award may be entered as judgment in any jurisdiction, or they
may specify a particular jurisdiction, such as a member state
of the United Nations Convention. 3 The host state may waive
100. See Layton, supra note 66.
101. See National American Corp. v. Nigeria, 420 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 868; [1976] 3
All E.R. 437; 120 Sol. J. 554; LGE Frankfurt 2.12 (1975), in DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHArr
47 (1976). For recent developments in the area of sovereign immunity, see Delaume,
Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399 (1977). See also the three
articles on sovereign immunity, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399-460 (1977).
102. For the state of ratification and accession, see U.N. Doc. ACN/9/118 (1976).
103. See Layton, supra note 66, at 745. A 1974 petroleum Agreement between
Japan and Peru accordingly declares the courts of Tokyo competent to enforce arbitral
awards.
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its objection of sovereign immunity and declare that the dis-
pute at issue is of a commercial nature. The effect of such
stipulations, however, is unclear. Lastly, a number of other
solutions are being developed to provide more security in en-
forcing contractual commitments. Investors and financing in-
stitutions increasingly insist that a trust account be held by a
trustee abroad (e.g., in New York) for the host country's central
bank in order to receive the proceeds from the sale of minerals.
Such trust accounts serve to improve the host state's foreign
currency position, but, by being potential objects for attach-
ment, they give some additional protection to the investors'
security interests. Thus the account provides security for the
financing institutions and the TNE. Posting of a security or a
guarantee from an investment insurance agency or a home
state may also increase the likelihood of prompt compliance
with the award.
Increasingly performance bonds are posted by the TNE to
secure its compliance with its contractual minimum expendi-
ture obligations, its production requirements, and the contrac-
tual program of work. Finally, the more an agreement and the
stipulated arbitration are responsive to developing countries'
particular problems, the less obstacles will be found to refusing
compliance.'"4
VI. CONCLUSION: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE REVISION OF
LONG TERM INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
A dilemma arises in connection with arbitration provisions
in mineral investment contracts. Arbitration and technical
decisions may often be a useful instrument to settle interpreta-
tive and technical disputes in an amicable way which does not
obstruct the further implementation of the agreement. How-
ever, the other function of international arbitration, i.e., the
stablization of initially unequal contracts for an excessively
long period of time, has led host countries to question the ad-
visability of such provisions. They feel international arbitra-
tion bodies serve primarily to police their demands for a change
in the rules of the game, thus unilaterally favoring TNEs.
The search for mutually acceptable solutions in this di-
lemma has led to a number of compromise positions. Perhaps
a separation of the clearly useful and acceptable mechanisms
104. Accordingly, further research is warranted on alternatives of contractual
drafting concerning dispute settlement and periodic revision or automatic readjust-
ment of the contractual terms.
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to settle the "minor" disputes (technical, interpretative, and
gap-filling) from the specific solutions devised for "major" dis-
putes of contract revision could take place. For major disputes
concerning a revision of contractual terms, a number of solu-
tions already formulated in agreements but largely still in the
phase of discussion 5 should be explored in greater depth.
The United Nations and other international organizations
have recently called for principles to guide the revision of une-
qual terms in long term investment agreements.' A number
of major long term agreements, particularly in petroleum but
also in nonfuel natural resources, e.g., bauxite, copper, or rub-
ber, have been revised to a considerable degree by a more or
less voluntary renegotiation.0 7 An analysis of the major legal
systems shows that adjustment of long term contracts is not as
unfamiliar as is often claimed in the criticism levied against
the unilateral revision of contractual terms by host countries.
Legal doctrines such as frustration and "imprevision" permit
some change in long-term contractual relationships once basic
circumstances have changed substantially. The concept of the
"Wegfall der Geschiftsgrundlage" (lapse of contractual basis)
in German law has been applied particularly to cases where
105. Cf. Smith and Wells, supra note 18, at 152; Z. MIKDASHI, THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES 152 (1976); M. MUGHRABY, PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY
OVER OnL RESOURCES 174 (1966). For the renegotiation of petroleum concessions dur-
ing the energy crisis, see Penrose, The Development of Crisis, 1975 DAEDALUS 52, 53;
Johnson, A Legal Alternative to Instability in International Oil, 6 NAT. RES. J. 368
(1966). See also the various views expounded on the reliance upon such concepts as
"change of circumstances" to justify a revision of contractual terms cited in note 92
supra.
Analysis of about 200 investment agreements in the area of natural resources
demonstrates that from 1971 to 1977 the number of renegotiation clauses (as a periodic
review or as a most-favored countrz clause in favor of the host country) has increased
substantially. Also, other contractual provisions designed to adjust the contractual
regime, e.g., sliding taxes, relinquishment obligations, and adjustment of prices to
relect world market developments, have been put to increasing use.
106. In particular, see OPEC Resoltion XVI.90 (1968), reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1183 (1968). As for the United Nations, see the sources cited supra note 93.
107. The most glaring example has been in the petroleum industry where com-
plete revisions of participation, state ownership, pricing structures, royalty expenses,
and tax rates have occurred, beginning slowly in the 1960s and achieving momentum
from 1972 to the present. A similar development has taken place in the bauxite indus-
try in the period from 1973 to 1975 with the introduction of state majority ownership,
production levies, and other financial arrangements benefiting the host countries. Less
visible have been the large numbers of renegotiations of most long term concession
agreements in rubber, timber, and nonfuel minerals.
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basic changes occurred and where long term relationships
needed judicial adjustment. 08 In international law the rebus sic
stantibus doctrine may in exceptional circumstances allow for
the adjustment of international treaty obligations.
Of particular interest are legal rules permitting a clarifica-
tion or even an adjustment of contractual terms by the court
in cases of exploitation of unequal bargaining power. This is
practiced in the German legal system, particularly to control
standard adhesion clauses.' In the agreements themselves
simple renegotiation clauses, most-favored clauses in favor of
the TNE or host country, and specific adjustment provisions
enhance the flexibility of the long term regime. A number of
other provisions, such as divestment, relinquishment, and slid-
ing tax provisions, furthermore "dynamize" the contractual
terms to take account of the change of circumstances and the
change in the bargaining power among the parties. In addition
the final and comprehensive regime for the investment is in-
creasingly no longer negotiated at the onset of prefeasibility
studies, where the uncertainty favors the TNE's position.
Often simple exploration contracts with some privileges con-
cerning later exploitation are concluded with provision for ne-
gotiation of the final conditions after the feasibility study has
reduced uncertainty and risk to a considerable degree.
Such devices to reduce the unequal distribution of bar-
gaining power, a source of later instability, and to insert flexi-
bility into the contractual regime must be explored and devel-
oped. Not all of them favor the host country. If an acceptable
mechanism of "dynamization" can be found, taking due ac-
count of the national sovereignty objective of the host country
and the reliance of the TNE, mechanisms of third-party deci-
sionmaking for deadlocked renegotiations might be discussed
and accepted by both parties. Such third-party decisions would
have to emanate from a forum which is not suspected of pos-
sessing an inherent bias in favor of one party. The negotiations
for the UN Law of the Sea Conference may point out the possi-
108. See Geiger, supra note 92.
109. Sections 242 and 315 III of the German Civil Code have been used by
German courts to control the misuse of superior bargaining power and skill in
standard adhesion clasuses (Allgemeine Geschiiftsbedingungen).
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ble outlines of such institutional framework for transnational
legal issues concerning foreign investment. The present evolu-
tion of contractual practice and the slow and gradual develop-
ment of international legal instruments to regulate the activi-
ties of TNEs, such as the Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations, '10 may bring about a universal set of principles
guiding transnational investment contracts. These guidelines
will not be the product of a particular set of capital-exporting
countries but rather the result of a universal process of bargain-
ing and consensus-finding.
110. See sources cited note 84 supra.

